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Abstract 
 
The present study addresses methodological, theoretical, and applied issues in safety climate 
research. Thirty SWOT-based semi-structured interviews were carried out in a large shipping 
company and its organizational network. This measurement approach was evaluated on its 
ability to produce data important for safety climate. The results show that this approach gives 
accurate indications of the construct: 77.3 % of safety-related statements in the interviews 
reflected the Safety Climate Model (Flin, Mearns, O’Connor, & Bryden, 2000). A qualitative 
evaluation of this model was also carried out to give a theoretical contribution to the model’s 
construct validity. The model was compared with an applied model for human factors – the 
Campaign Model – constructed from a safety campaign developed in the community of high-
risk industries. Results indicate that communication – as defined in the Campaign Model – 
should be included in the Safety Climate Model: 47.6 % of the statements not reflected in the 
Safety Climate Model, were accounted for by the communication dimension in the Campaign 
Model. The statements reflected in the Campaign Model were further applied as an indication 
of the campaign’s effectiveness in raising awareness on human factors: 71.5 % of all the 
statements were reflected in the Campaign Model, hence also in the safety campaign, 
indicating a high level of awareness on human factors probably due to the campaign. 
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On March 24, 1989, the tanker Exxon Valdez, on route from Valdez, Alaska to Los 
Angeles, California, ran aground on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska. The vessel 
was traveling outside normal shipping lanes in an attempt to avoid ice. William Murphy, a 
ships pilot, was hired to assist in maneuvering the 300 meters long vessel through the Valdez 
Narrows. At his side was the Captain of the vessel, Joe Hazelwood. Helmsman Harry Claar 
was steering. After passing through Valdez Narrows, Pilot Murphy disembarked. The Exxon 
Valdez encountered icebergs in the shipping lanes and Captain Hazelwood ordered Claar to 
take the Exxon Valdez out of the shipping lanes to go around the ice. He then handed over 
control of the wheelhouse to Third Officer Gregory Cousins with instructions to turn back 
into the shipping lanes when the vessel reached a certain point. At that time, Claar was 
relieved by Helmsman Robert Kagan. For reasons that remain unclear, Cousins and Kagan 
failed to make the turn back into the shipping lanes and the ship ran aground on Bligh Reef at 
12:04 a.m. The Exxon Valdez spilled approximately 41 million of its 200 million liters cargo 
of crude oil. The oil spill would eventually impact over 1770 kilometers of coastline in 
Alaska, making the Exxon Valdez the largest and best known oil spill to date in U.S. waters.
 The National Transportation Safety Board investigated the accident and determined 
five probable causes of the grounding: (a) The third officer failed to properly maneuver the 
vessel, possibly due to fatigue and excessive workload; (b) the Master failed to provide a 
proper navigation watch, possibly due to impairment from alcohol; (c) Exxon Shipping 
Company failed to supervise the Master and provide a rested and sufficient crew for the 
Exxon Valdez; (d) the U.S. Coast Guard failed to provide an effective vessel traffic system; 
and (e) effective pilot and escort services were lacking (Encyclopedia of Earth: 
http://www.eoearth.org/article/Exxon_Valdez_oil_spill).  
Human factors were, without a doubt, contributing factors, if not the only factors 
involved in all the identified probable causes of this disaster. The accident shocked the whole 
shipping industry and since then, preventive attempts to improve safety in the shipping 
industry have been particularly focused around one finding that seems to be consistent in the 
majority of accident investigations: 60-80 % of all accidents in the shipping industry can be 
traced back to human factors (Perrow, 1999). 
 Identifying and understanding potentially risky situations is the key contribution of 
human factors in systems design. Optimizing the human interaction with systems involves 
identifying human factors that enhance performance and reduce errors, increase safety and 
increase user satisfaction (Weich & Sutcliffe, 2001).  
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Human factors can be identified on several levels within an organization. The 
immediate level of which to study human factors is the personnel level (Hetherington, Flin, & 
Mearns, 2006). This level deals with human performance factors or behaviors that may 
directly contribute to or prevent incidents or accidents. Hetherington et al. (2006) have 
identified the following human factors on the personnel level commonly involved in maritime 
incidents: fatigue, stress, health, situation awareness, decision making and cognitive demands, 
communication, language and cultural diversity, and teamwork. 
 An underlying level of which human factors can be studied is the organizational level. 
Human factors on this level are identified in the decisions, policies, or procedures made at the 
organizational level (management values and practices) - in the field of psychology 
commonly referred to as safety climate (Hetherington et al., 2006). Organizational safety 
climate is often described as a snapshot of selected aspects of the organizational culture at a 
particular time (Mearns, Whittaker, & Flin, 2003). One commonly used definition of safety 
climate was proposed by Zohar (2000), where climate perceptions relate to “procedures as 
patterns”, whereby consistent procedures represent patterns that reflect the importance and 
prioritization of safety over competing goals. 
An increased emphasis on non-technical skills among seafarers has resulted in 
innumerable training and simulation programs. The strategies implemented to decrease the 
number of accidents related to human factors have, however, largely been unsuccessful 
because they have failed to acknowledge that accidents cannot be prevented solely by 
introducing countermeasures on the personnel level. Research in recent years has therefore 
focused more on human factors on the organizational level and on developing strategies 
designed to change the safety climate within the whole organization (Perrow, 1999).    
 
The present study 
 The present study has been carried out in a large Bermuda-based shipping company 
(operating in Norway), anonymized as Fortuna, and its organizational network. Every year 
since 2002, the company has invested between four and six million Norwegian kroner in a 
safety campaign targeted at human factors. The purpose has been to raise awareness and 
promote changes in attitudes and behaviors among all personnel connected to the 
organizational network.  
The study has three main objectives. First, it will aim to give a contribution to the 
methodological discussion concerning measurement approaches to safety climate (e.g. Schein, 
2004; Schneider, 2000) by answering the question: Can a precise, valid, and reliable 
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indication of safety climate be obtained by using semi-structured interviews as a measurement 
approach? To provide input on this question, the study will apply a method for performing 
interviews never previously used as a measurement approach to safety climate. Second, the 
study will give a contribution to a theoretical discussion. A state-of-the-art model for safety 
climate (Flin, Mearns, O’Connor, & Bryden, 2000), referred to in this study as the Safety 
Climate Model, will be compared to a model for human factors derived from Fortuna’s safety 
campaign (from here on termed the Campaign Model): Are there any factors involved in 
determining safety climate that are not included in the Safety Climate Model proposed by Flin 
et al. (2000)? The purpose is to investigate whether an applied model for human factors - the 
Campaign Model - developed in the practical community of safety-critical industries, can give 
a theoretical contribution to the further developments of the Safety Climate Model (Flin et al., 
2000). Third, an indication of the effectiveness of Fortuna’s safety campaign will be deduced 
through the comparison of the Safety Climate Model and the Campaign Model. These 
practical implications are not worthless to the study’s theoretical contribution, however, as 
they will stipulate the premises for the findings.   
A theoretical framework for studying organizational safety climate as well as an 
account for the theoretical foundations of the Campaign Model will be given through the 
following.  
 
Theoretical framework 
 
Organizational culture and climate 
 Organizational culture and climate both describe employees’ experiences of their 
organization. The two concepts are interconnected in many ways. Organizational culture can 
be seen as a “state” of the existing system, even as one knows that the system is dynamic and 
perpetually evolving. Shared values, common assumptions, or patterns of beliefs held by 
organizational members will then create the foundation for culture (Hale, 2000; Schneider, 
2000). Climate, on the other hand, must in this respect be understood as a cultural artifact 
resulting from espoused values and shared assumptions, manifested in behavior (Schneider, 
2000).  
 Many have argued (e.g. Schneider, 2000; Patterson, West, Shackleton, Dawson, 
Lawthom, Maitlis, Robinson, &Wallace, 2005) that in order for a climate construct to be 
useful, it should be strategically focused - climates for creativity, innovation, safety, or 
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service, for example. The climate may then be found in the procedures and patterns of 
interactions, and behaviors that support these qualities in the organization.  
 The many attempts to differentiate between the two concepts have also influenced the 
approaches of how to measure them. Most climate research has been focused on 
quantitatively based questionnaire measures applied comparatively across several 
organizations, while most culture researchers have advocated the use of qualitative measures 
with a focus on single organizations (Ashkanasy, Wilderom, & Peterson, 2000). The rationale 
behind these two different measurement approaches has been that behavior, as an indication 
of climate, is easier to measure through quantitatively based questionnaires than the more 
underlying, hidden and indirect values and norms thought to represent culture (Svyantek & 
Bott, 2004).  
  
The concept of organizational safety climate 
The concept of safety climate is a strategically focused approach for studying the 
broader and super ordinate concept of organizational climate. The earliest located paper on 
safety climate is from 1951 (Keenan, Kerr, & Sherman, in Guldenmund, 2000). Since then, 
theory and research paradigms have improved, but not to the extent that a comprehensive 
theory on safety climate exists, nor has a measurement approach been developed that is 
widely acknowledged.         
 Factors in safety climate – the Safety Climate Model. Many climate researchers have 
postulated that safety climate perceptions refer to those attributes of policies, procedures and 
practices that indicate the true priority of safety (e.g. Zohar, 2000; Zohar, 2002). These may 
vary from the formal declarations, strategy, or profile. The actual climate thus reflects a silent 
agreement regarding how to prioritize safety, not an objective measure of formal policies, 
procedures and practices that can be linked to safety. For example, if safety issues time after 
time are being ignored or prioritized over production pressure, the workers will relate this to 
low safety priority, which again will lead them to draw the conclusion that speed is more 
likely to be rewarded before safety (Zohar & Luria, 2005).   
In a review of the research that has attempted to measure safety climate, Flin et al. 
(2000) sought to identify a common set of factors that are being regularly included in 
measures of safety climate. 18 published reports on safety climate surveys were reviewed 
after a literature search, eliminating surveys that did not live up to predefined criteria. In the 
final sample, 50 % of the studies were from the energy/petrochemical sector.  
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Flin et al. (2000) identified six features in the reviewed surveys, and proposed an 
additional two: The prime theme identified as worthy of measurement in relation to 
organizational safety climate involves perceptions of management attitudes and behavior in 
relation to safety as well as to production, or other issues (selection, discipline, planning, etc.). 
The theme was included in all the reviewed surveys. It is generally measured by respondents’ 
satisfaction with supervision or their perceptions of the supervisors’ attitudes and behaviors 
with respect to safety. The second theme identified in almost every survey was labeled safety 
systems and involves many different aspects of the organization’s safety management system, 
including safety officials, safety committees, permit to work systems, safety policies and 
safety equipment. Generally, respondents were asked to indicate their satisfaction with such 
aspects of the safety system or to indicate agreement/disagreement with statements relating to 
system performance. The third theme, risk was frequently included but appeared under many 
labels, for example; self-reported risk taking, perceptions of risk/hazards on the worksite and 
attitudes towards risk and safety. Work pace and workload was the fourth theme and appeared 
in a number of surveys. It was labeled work pressure. A related theme, which overlaps this 
variable (and the management attitudes and behaviors variable), is the balance maintained 
between pressure for production on the one hand and safety on the other. The fifth theme was 
related to competence, and covers the employees’ perception of the general level of workers’ 
qualifications, skills and knowledge, with associated aspects relating to selection, training, 
competence standards and their assessment. This factor is also likely to be influenced by 
broader economic conditions such as the labor market for a particular industrial sector, and 
available training budgets. In the shipping industry, together with other industries, there is an 
increasing emphasis on competence in non-technical skills (e.g. leadership, decision making) 
which are considered contributing factors to safe operations. These are commonly taught 
through, for example, Crew Resource Management (CRM) programs (see Salas, Wilson, 
Burke, & Wightman, 2006). As such training becomes more widespread, Flin et al. (2000) 
suggest that this aspect of the skill base may also need to be incorporated into the competence 
variable. The sixth theme, procedures and rules, did not emerge in many of the reviewed 
surveys. Other researchers have, however, identified this theme as an important factor 
(Guldenmund, 2000), and Flin et al. (2000) therefore recommend this factor included as a 
dimension of safety climate. Perceptions of safety rules, attitudes to rules and compliance or 
violation of procedures are covered by this theme.   
Flin et al. (2000) suggest that further research is needed to determine these features 
and identify other features of organizational safety climate. They propose that other features 
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of the more underlying climate could be blame and organizational learning, constituting the 
seventh and eighth factors. These features may also prove to be better defined as a measure of 
culture as they can not be directly linked to behavior, however strongly determined by 
climate.  
Measurement approaches to safety climate. Previous attempts to replicate factor 
structures of safety climate scales have not been entirely successful (e.g. Brown & Holmes, 
1986; Dedobbeleer & Béland, 1991). If a basic factor set can be established, it must be shown 
to be reliable, valid, sufficiently comprehensive and theoretically justifiable.  
Safety climate is, as indicated above, commonly measured through questionnaire 
surveys (e.g. Zohar, 2000; Zohar et al., 2005). Most empirical studies have used an aggregate 
unit of analysis, such as the work group, department or organization. Such climates have been 
operationally constructed by aggregating individual scores to the appropriate level and using 
the mean to represent climate at that level. The rationale behind aggregating individual data to 
a unit level is the assumption that organizational units have their own climate and that these 
can be identified through the demonstration of significant between-groups variance in climate 
in different units, and significant within-group agreement in perceptions within units (James, 
1982, in Patterson et al., 2005, p. 380). Perceptual agreement implies a shared assignment of 
psychological meaning allowing individual perceptions to be aggregated and treated as a 
higher level construct, particularly on the group level. Most research is now focused on 
aggregated climate (Schneider, Browen, Ehrhart, & Holcombe, 2000).  
In a study from 2005, Zohar and Luria used the Multilevel Model of Safety Climate, 
earlier developed by Zohar (2000, 2002) as a theoretical framework for investigating and 
measuring safety climate on organization and group level. The model is based on an 
interpretation of climate where the concept can be analyzed and measured on different 
organizational levels, and where perceptions or evaluations of relevant policies, procedures, 
and practices serve as indicators of desired climate. These indicators can vary; they are often 
inconsistent and contradictory. The model presupposes that employees in an organization will 
try to make a meaningful interpretation of the prevailing policies and procedures defined by 
top management which makes it easier for them to follow the bottom-line priorities at the 
working place. Zohar et al. (2005) infers that the core of the climate construct is determined 
by socially formed indications of desired role behavior, something that is expressed through 
policies, procedures, and supervisory actions demonstrated by personnel practices. Climate 
perceptions at an organizational level, with reference to established organizational policies, 
procedures, and top management actions are, according to this line of reasoning, implemented 
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and known throughout the whole organization (assuming the perception of organizational 
climate is homogeneous at this organizational level). Further, the perceptions of supervisory 
practices on group level will only be prevailing within the subunits. Assuming this conclusion 
is true, there will be within-groups homogeneity and between-groups variance on subunit 
level (group level). In order to measure safety climate in an organization, Zohar et al. (2005) 
suggest that data needs to be collected and compared from several organizational units 
operating within the same organizational level. If there is strong agreement within units at the 
same organizational level, it is implied that the safety climate is strong (Zohar, 2000; Zohar, 
2002; Zohar et al., 2005; Schneider, Salvaggio, & Subirats, 2002). 
 
Shipping company Fortuna’s safety campaign and the Campaign Model 
Fortuna’s safety campaign was launched in 2002, and is still in operation. It is targeted 
at human factors with the purpose of raising awareness and promoting changes in attitudes 
and behavior among all personnel connected to the organizational network. The company’s 
goal is to improve year by year on safety in terms of a successive reduction in the number of 
accidents and incidents and, to ultimately have the world’s safest fleet. Accident statistics 
show a reduction in the number of accidents and incidents from 2002 to 2005. In 2006 there 
was a high increase in both number and seriousness of accidents followed by a decrease in 
2007. The campaign has been developed by external parties, including a psychologist with 
specialization in organizational psychology, a flight pilot and a media company - all of whom 
are subject experts within the Norwegian community of safety-critical industries.   
Fortuna’s safety campaign is based on principles from the SHELL Model (Hawkins, 
1987; Edwards, 1988) and Crew Resource Management (CRM) training (Salas, Burke, 
Bowers, & Wilson, 2001; Salas et al., 2006). The two components will briefly be addressed 
below. 
The SHELL (software, hardware, environment, liveware, liveware) Model. The 
SHELL Model, originally developed by Edwards (1972, in Edwards, 1988), has its origin 
from the aviation industry. It is considered valuable for developing taxonomies of human 
error causal relationships and for studying the links existing between persons, organizations 
and society. It considers a basic unit made of four elements: The first resource is named 
hardware (H), and consists of physical property – buildings, equipment, vehicles, materials, 
and so on. The second resource, software (S), is much of what can be set down in a collection 
of documents. It comprises the rules, regulations, laws, orders, standard operating procedures, 
customs, practices and habits governing the manner in which the system operates and in 
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which the information within it is organized. Human beings make up the third resource, 
named liveware (L). The fourth resource is an additional liveware (L) dimension, and 
accounts for the fact that people interact with each other as well as with machines. It thus 
represents the other persons directly involved in the task environment (Edwards, 1988). 
According to Edwards (1988), no arrangements of hardware, software, and liveware exist in a 
vacuum - they will operate in the context of the environment (E), made up of physical, 
economic, political, and social factors. These environmental factors are also considered 
system resources, regardless of whether they are controllable or not. It is in the interface 
between any of these four elements that human error may occur. 
Crew Resource Management (CRM) training. It is in the interface between the two 
liveware components in the SHELL Model that CRM training must be considered. This team 
training strategy is focused on improving crew coordination and performance (Salas et al., 
2006). Like the SHELL Model, it originates from the aviation industry (Cacciabue, Mauri, & 
Owen, 2003). The training strategy refers to a set of defined cognitive and social skills: 
communication, teamwork, situation awareness, leadership, assertiveness, decision making 
and work management, which should contribute to enhanced ability to work in teams and also 
enhanced safety performance (Salas, Burke, Bowers, & Wilson, 2001; Hetherington et al., 
2006). The training strategy is primarily targeted at human factors on the personnel level. 
However, as standardized frames for utilizing this training are lacking, it has been largely up 
to each community using CRM training to set the framework for what is to be taught and how 
(Salas et al., 2006). Fortuna’s safety campaign is designed to enforce changes in attitudes and 
behaviors not only on the personnel level but also on the organizational level. 
The Campaign Model.  Based on the theoretical foundation for Fortuna’s safety 
campaign outlined above, the campaign materials, and the documented efforts made to 
implement the campaign, the eight-factor Campaign Model has been constructed. The 
rationale behind constructing a model from the campaign is that it should be in a format that 
makes it methodically justifiable to compare to the Safety Climate Model (Flin et al., 2000). It 
is assumed, however, that a methodological reconversion of results for the purpose of drawing 
conclusions about the effect of the campaign is also possible.  
The first four factors in the Campaign Model relate only to the personnel level, and 
include: stress/mental capacity, fatigue, authority, and situation awareness.   
The following four factors relate primarily to the organizational level, but also apply to 
the personnel level: Communication and blame is the fifth factor, and aims to improve both 
the quantity and quality of communication between and within each organizational unit. The 
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means suggested for accomplishing this is shortening the distances between organizational 
units in terms of for example regular visits, seminars, and social gatherings. The factor is 
targeted at improving the sense of unity within the organizational network. The 
communication of a no-blame organizational atmosphere is also integrated in this factor. 
Leadership is the sixth factor and includes raising awareness about the direct power and 
influence leaders have over employees: Not only the leadership styles and decisions taken by 
leaders in top management but also leaders on lower hierarchical levels, have both a direct 
and indirect effect upon how policies and procedures are practiced by employees. This factor 
somewhat overlaps the authority factor. The seventh factor identified relates to the team as a 
barrier, and involves suggestions on how to optimize teams in the organization within and 
across organizational units. Key concepts here relate to knowledge management and raising 
awareness on how creative solutions and innovative thoughts are often promoted through 
teamwork. The team is seen as a barrier in line with other necessary barriers to prevent 
accidents and is a result of the recognition that no human is flawless and no system is perfect 
(Reason, 1997). This factor relates to both the personnel and the organizational level of 
human factors and is an important component of the model. The final factor in the model 
relates to an overall safety profile. It can be defined as a clear and goal directed promotion of 
safety commitment in terms of spending money and resources on improving safety. This factor 
relates to top management initiatives like, for example, the campaign itself, organizing safety 
seminars for employees on all organizational levels or, employing safety officers whose main 
purpose is to promote and raise awareness about human factors involved in safety. It also 
reflects how these initiatives are welcomed by the rest of the organization. The objectives of 
this factor are to educate the organization in that safety is not just created on the personnel 
level of the organization (the vessels). It is, rather, a result of goal-directed efforts from the 
whole organizational network. In that way, the success of this factor is fundamental for the 
progress of the entire campaign. 
The above presentation of the safety campaign and the Campaign Model has been 
approved by its creators and by Fortuna.      
 
Hypotheses 
In his master’s thesis from the University of Oslo, Straumsheim (2007) found that 
semi-structured interviews constructed around a SWOT-based format (Dyson, 2002; Langer, 
Alfirevic, Pavicic, 2005) captured more aspects of an organization’s psychosocial work 
environment than the QPSNordic (Dallner, Elo, Gamberale, Knardal, Lindström, Skogstad, & 
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Ørhede, 2000, in Straumsheim, 2007) and the HSE indicator tool (Cousins, MacKay, Clarke, 
Kelly, Kelly, & McCraig, 2004, in Straumsheim, 2007). They are both survey instruments for 
measuring psychosocial work environment. Whether there is reason to believe that the same 
applies for the concept of safety climate, has never previously been investigated. 
Interviews provide an alternative to the often used strategy of validating 
questionnaires through established models, a strategy that may be vulnerable to the common 
problem of method variance (Robson, 2002). Semi-structured interviews give an opportunity 
for the respondents to state what they consider critical aspects of a certain topic; here safety 
climate. The range of potentially important topics is to a smaller degree limited by the 
researcher’s choice of measurement approach in interviews than in questionnaire surveys. 
 The SWOT analysis identifies the strengths and weaknesses in an organization, 
matching them with the opportunities and threats for the future. Having identified these 
factors, strategies are developed which are able to build on the strengths, eliminate the 
weaknesses, exploit the opportunities, and counter the threats (Dyson, 2002), ultimately 
achieving a strategic fit with reality and laying the foundation for intervention planning. The 
strengths and weaknesses are identified by an internal appraisal of the organization (e.g. 
personnel, product, services and facilities) and the opportunities and threats by an external 
appraisal (e.g. political, economical and competitive environment) (Langer, et al., 2005).  
For the present study, the SWOT-format is considered useful for the purpose of 
eliciting experiences, points of views and evaluations of the safety climate and human factors 
within the organizational network, not only for the present situation (strengths and 
weaknesses), but also for the future perspective (opportunities and threats). It is expected that 
semi-structured interviews building on a SWOT-format will be able to elicit data that would 
not have been revealed through questionnaire measures. The hypotheses are as follows: 
1. Semi-structured interviews based on a SWOT-format will bring forth data that reflect 
the eight factors in the Safety Climate Model proposed by Flin et al. (2000).  
2. Based on Straumsheim’s (2007) findings, it is expected that the interviews will bring 
fourth relevant data on safety climate, not accounted for by the Safety Climate Model 
proposed by Flin et al. (2000). It will be investigated whether the four human factors 
on the organizational level in the Campaign Model can give an account of these data 
and contribute to further developments of the Safety Climate Model. 
3. If the Campaign Model is addressing human factors, and Fortuna’s safety campaign 
has been successful in raising awareness, then the human factors identified in the 
model, should be strongly reflected in the interviews.  
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Method 
 
The present study investigates the safety focus in an organizational network, not a 
single organization. This gives some implications as to how organizational levels are 
identified, and calls for an outline of the present organizational network structure. All the 
information about Fortuna and its organizational network presented here, has been acquired 
through company documents or from informants employed in Fortuna. The information has 
been approved by Fortuna. 
 
Fortuna’s organizational network structure   
 Shipping company Fortuna is one of the world’s largest private owned tanker 
companies, owning and operating around 80 vessels mainly carrying crude oil. All vessels are 
technically and commercially outsourced to third party ship management companies. Fortuna 
has around 40 employees who are divided into a technical department, chartering department, 
operations department and financial department. The technical department is responsible for 
monitoring, approving and supporting actions taken by the ship management companies on 
their area of responsibility and expertise respectively. The only parts of the business not 
outsourced, are the trading of the vessels, i.e. the chartering department.  
 The ship management companies. The technical management of the vessels is 
outsourced to five ship management companies located around the world. These are 
independent companies selling services to Fortuna, this being technical management and 
crewing of the vessels. Since the campaign started in 2002, none of the ship management 
companies has left or joined the organizational network. The companies are responsible for 
managing the vessels in a manner that complies with international rules and regulations, rules 
defined by the flag state of the vessels, port state regulations, and standards defined by oil 
majors.  
Each ship management company manages between 7 and 20 vessels each for Fortuna. 
These vessels compose the Fortuna fleet for each ship management company. The companies 
receive a fixed management fee for each vessel they manage on behalf of Fortuna. This fee 
covers their expenses and profit. For each vessel, an annual budget is established and Fortuna 
funds the ship management company monthly according to this budget. Each of the Fortuna 
vessels have a designated person from the ship management company, a Superintendent, to 
whom the crew report and who has daily contact with the vessel through telephone, e-mails 
and regular visits to the vessel. Superintendents are responsible for between 1 and 5 vessels 
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each. The Superintendents usually report to a fleet manager supervising the entire Fortuna 
fleet within each ship management company. These Fleet Managers further report to their 
designated Fleet Manager within the technical department in Fortuna. The Superintendents 
responsible for the vessels are the only ones in direct contact with the ship staff from the 
technical side on a regular basis.   
In addition to technical management of a number of vessels for Fortuna, one of the 
ship management companies also provides post fixture services to all Fortuna vessels. This 
service relates to the handling of port calls as well as speed and fuel calculations. Post fixture 
operators monitor the voyage from the port where the vessel is loading, during the voyage and 
up until the vessel is finished discharging at the next port. They are in direct contact with all 
vessels, advising them about time, speed, and charterer’s voyage orders for loading and 
discharging when at port, as well as bunkering operations.  
 The vessels and their crew. All Fortuna vessels are manned by crew provided by the 
ship management companies. Most of these companies have their own crewing centers - 
located at different places in the world - where seafarers are recruited, trained and educated. 
Within each ship management company, there is a pool of seafarers designated to sail only on 
vessels within the Fortuna fleet. The retention rates of crew vary however, depending on 
stability of crew supply within each ship management company respectively; crew may 
change employer, or they may change crew pool within the same employer. Crew supply is 
largely dependent on the number of vessels within the world fleet compared to the number of 
seafarers available in the world at any given time. At the present time, there is a general lack 
of seafarers within the world fleet.  
A vast majority of Fortuna vessels are manned with multinational crew. The lowest 
ranks onboard the vessels, ratings, are primarily manned by Philippinos, whereas most 
officers come from former Soviet countries, Eastern Europe or India.  
 The vessels are manned with between 21 and 25 crew members. The Master has the 
overall responsibility for all departments. The top management team on the vessels includes 
the Master, the Chief Engineer, the Chief Officer and the Second Engineer. The Master and 
the Chief Engineer receive orders from the Superintendent in charge of the vessel regarding 
technical matters, and report back to him/her. In addition, the Master receives orders from 
designated post fixture operators regarding commercial matters and reports back to him/her. 
For the purpose of addressing safety within this organizational network, all the 
organizational units described above will be involved in determining it. It is therefore 
necessary to construct a somewhat artificial organizational structure within this organizational 
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network: In the present research design, Fortuna will be regarded as top management; the five 
ship management companies will be defined as departments or subunits, all of them 
representing mid level management; and the vessels will be regarded as working units under 
mid level management and will from here on be referred to as the personnel level.  
  
Participants  
A structured sample of 32 informed individuals were interviewed in the period 
between 10.10.07 and 10.11.07. Eleven interviews were carried out among members of top 
management in Norway, 11 interviews among members of mid level management in 
Glasgow, and 10 interviews onboard one of the vessels at sea between Singapore and Dubai. 
The sample was selected according to four criteria: First, it should, as far as possible represent 
the expert knowledge present within the organizational network (Flick, 2002). Second, the 
number of interviewees on each organizational level should be the same. Third, the ship 
management company chosen to represent mid level management should represent both the 
technical management of the vessels and the commercial post fixture management (only one 
ship management company satisfied this criterion). Fourth, the chosen vessel for conducting 
interviews on the personnel level should be managed by the ship management company that 
was also represented in the sample. These criteria were established in order to minimize third-
variable problems.  
Ten interviewees were Norwegian, 10 British, 5 Philippino, 4 Russian, 1 Ukrainian, 
and 1 Australian. The interviews with Norwegian interviewees were carried out in Norwegian 
and the rest of the interviews were carried out in English, where only the British and the 
Australian interviewees were native English speakers. One interviewee was female and the 
rest were males. The average age was 42 years old, the youngest being 19 and the oldest 62. 
All participants in the study were treated in accordance with APA ethical codes (American 
Psychological Association, 2002). 
 
Measures  
The interviews were based on principles from SWOT analysis (Dyson, 2002; Langer 
et al., 2005), asking the interviewees to reflect upon safety within the organizational network, 
focusing on the strengths and weaknesses in the organization, and opportunities and threats in 
the environment as seen from their point of view. 
In order to get as much information as possible out of the interviewees without leading 
them in any direction, a semi-structured interview format was used, asking very general and 
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open questions, leaving it largely up to the interviewee to decide what he/she wanted to talk 
about, however within the frames that the topic gives (Kvale, 1996). The introduction letter 
that was handed out to the interviewees before the interviews and the interview guide are 
presented in the appendix. In this form of interview, the interviewee is of minor interest as a 
person, rather it is his/her capacity of being an expert in a certain field of activity that is the 
center of attention. He/she is integrated into the study not as a single case but as representing 
a group of specific experts. The range of potentially relevant information provided by the 
interviewee is rather restricted (Flick, 2002, p. 89).   
The same questions were asked to all interviewees and included the following: “What 
do you consider strengths in this organizational network regarding safety?”, “What do you 
consider weaknesses in this organizational network regarding safety?”, “Can you think of any 
means for improving the quality of safety in the organizational network?” and “Can you 
identify any problems that would prevent better safety in the organizational network?” 
Follow-up questions were related to what the interviewees had already been talking about and 
could include the following: “Could you say something more about that?”, “Can you give an 
example?”, “Can you think of anything else?”, “Am I understanding you correctly in that 
what you are saying is…?”, or “What do you mean by that?” 
 
Procedure 
 Carrying out the interviews. All the interviews were carried out in the interviewees’ 
working environment by two Master’s degree students in psychology, and lasted for 
approximately one hour. Before each interview, the interviewees were briefed about the 
purpose of the interview, the format of the interview, the confidentiality of what was said 
during the interview and their right to withdraw from the interview at any time if they wished 
to do so. The interviewees were also asked whether they felt comfortable with having their 
interview tape-recorded. Two interviewees did not wish to be tape-recorded, and these two 
interviews were later excluded from further analysis. The final sample thus consisted of 30 
interviewees; 10 from the top management level, 11 from mid level management and 9 from 
the personnel level. Finally, a consent form was signed by both interviewee and interviewers. 
After each interview, the interviewees were debriefed and given the opportunity to ask 
questions if they wanted to do so. In the interviews conducted on the personnel level, it was 
considered desirable that the interviewers developed a relationship of trust with the 
interviewees: It was suspected that the interviewees would provide untrue data if they had not 
trusted the interviewers. The interviewers therefore sailed for 14 days with the vessel in which 
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the interviewees worked, interacting with all members of the crew both during their work and 
spare time. After one week of sailing, the first interview was conducted.   
Transcription. The interviews were transcribed by the same two persons who had 
carried out the interviews, sharing the transcription load equally between them. The 
transcription was done as carefully as possible, making sure that no information from the 
interviews was left out in the transcription. However, stuttering or incomplete sentences often 
present orally, especially when the interviewee was not speaking his/her native language, was 
either cut out in the transcription phase or transcribed correctly if there was no doubt as to 
what the interviewee had meant. Random tests were carried out by the two persons who 
transcribed the interviews on each other’s transcription to ensure the reliability and validity of 
the transcription.  
 
Analysis 
Quantitative coding analysis. The transcribed interviews were coded in NVivo 7, a 
computer program designed to categorize qualitative data and quantify statements drawn from 
the data. In the first step, statements were drawn out of the interviews, coding them only as 
statements on a line-by-line basis (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). After this initial process, no 
information that could be linked to safety in any way was left in any of the interviews. The 
definition of a statement used in the coding of the interviews was as follows: “The smallest 
meaningful unit of a sentence or several sentences that can directly or indirectly be linked to 
safety”. If the interviewee spoke about the same thing several times, it was coded as multiple 
statements as long as it was not in the same sequence of the text; sequence in this context 
meaning the interviewee speaking about the same topic without moving to another topic.  
In the second step, the statements were coded on two categories: The first category 
was organizational level, and refers to which organizational level the statement was targeted 
at (four dimensions: the industry level, top management level, mid level management or 
personnel level). The industry level was included after it was discovered that some statements 
could not be linked to the organizational network directly, but was of a broader and super 
ordinate character. On occasions where it was unclear as to which organizational level the 
statement was targeted at, it was placed in only one of the relevant levels, decided after 
discussion and reasoning between the two coders. Statements concerning Fortuna’s safety 
campaign were consistently coded on the top management level. The second category was 
SWOT, and refers to whether the statement could be identified as a strength, weakness, 
opportunity or a threat. If the statement could not be identified as a strength, weakness, 
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opportunity or a threat, there was also an option to code it as not accounted for by SWOT. All 
of the initial statements drawn from the interviews could however be identified as either a 
strength, weakness, opportunity or a threat, and this category was thus eliminated. The 
criterion for coding a statement as either a strength or a weakness was that the statement 
reflected views and opinions about the present situation and ongoing work that could directly 
or indirectly be linked to safety within the organizational network. The criterion for coding a 
statement as an opportunity or a threat was that the statement reflected views and opinions 
about future external or environmental factors that could directly or indirectly affect safety 
within the organizational network. Statements coded in either of these dimensions thus reflect 
primarily external factors, such as political or social, which may aid or prevent the 
organizational network in their work on improving safety. However, statements coded in 
either of these two dimensions can also represent possibilities, suggestions or obstacles for 
either of the units within the organizational network, identified by interviewees employed in 
either of the other units within the organizational network. 
Inter-rater reliability in the coding of statements, SWOT and organizational levels. 
Thorough knowledge about the structure of Fortuna and its organizational network, the 
shipping industry, and the context in which the interviews had taken place, was considered 
necessary for a precise and correct extraction and coding of the statements. All interviews 
were therefore coded together by the same two persons who had carried out and transcribed 
the interviews according to predefined definitions. Two of the interviews were coded 
separately by the two raters before an inter-rater reliability of identified statements in the 
interview was calculated on the basis of percent agreement. The inter-rater reliability on 
identified statements was 71.4 %. After this, Cohen’s Kappa was calculated for agreement in 
coding over both SWOT and organizational level for the statements identified by both raters 
(Bordens & Abbott, 2005). Cohen’s Kappa (κ) for agreement on coding over SWOT levels 
was .73 and over organizational level .78. The agreement among the raters was considered 
satisfactory according to Baker and Gottman (1989, in Bordens & Abbott, 2005)  
Data treatment in SPSS. The data from the quantitative coding analysis was plotted as 
variables in SPSS 16.0, a computer program for quantitative data analysis. Repeated measures 
ANOVA were carried out to establish main and interaction effects. 
Qualitative content analysis. A content analysis of the identified statements was 
carried out retrospective of the quantitative coding. Statements were clustered in themes based 
on their content and meaning. Statements referring to similar meaning were thus clustered in 
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the same theme within the previously established SWOT and organizational level distribution. 
The themes for the clustering were developed parallel to the content analysis.  
After the clustering of statements in themes based on their meaning, the clustered 
themes were compared qualitatively with the Safety Climate Model (Flin et al., 2000) and the 
Campaign Model.  
 
Ethical considerations 
 Voluntary participation and informed consent. Organizational units in which the 
interviews were conducted, were contacted to ask if employees were willing to participate. It 
was informed before each interview by the interviewers, and through the informed consent 
form, that participation in the study was voluntary and that participants had the possibility to 
withdraw from the study at any time if they wished to do so. A written consent form was 
signed by the two interviewers and the interviewees before each interview.  
The interviewers, writing their Master’s thesis in connection with Fortuna, may have 
been regarded as representatives from Fortuna. Subjects may therefore have felt obliged to 
participate even though they knew that their participation was voluntary.  
Anonymity. Before each interview participants were informed, both through the 
consent form and also verbally, that all the information gathered and used from the interviews 
would be treated anonymously, and that any information that could be directly linked to the 
interviewees would be deleted or anonymized.     
 Informed consent regarding the use of tape-recorder and transcription. The interviews 
were tape-recorded on a micro cassette player after verbal consent from interviewees. The 
participants were informed about the purpose of the tape-recording and that these recordings 
would later be transcribed by the two interviewers. They were also informed about who would 
have access to the recordings and the transcriptions. It was assured that the information would 
be treated anonymously and not made known to any other members of the organizational 
network and, that the information would never be used against them in any way.  
 Treatment of data. After the transcription and reliability testing of the transcription, 
the tape-recordings were erased. All data files regarding the transcriptions and the interviews 
were also erased. The two interviewers have one copy each of the transcriptions and have 
taken the full responsibility for these and any information that may be deduced from these. 
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Results 
 
From the analyzed interviews (N=30), a total of 736 statements were identified. The 
distribution of statements was as follows over organizational levels: 286 (M=9.5, SD=7.3) at 
the top management level, 175 (M=5.8, SD=5.8) at mid level management, 196 (M=6.5, 
SD=4.6) at the personnel level (the vessels), and 79 statements (M=2.6, SD=3.1) were targeted 
at the industry level. The distribution of statements on the SWOT levels was as follows: 204 
statements (M=6.8, SD=5.7) were coded as strengths, 276 statements (M=9.2, SD=4.8) as 
weaknesses, 159 statements (M=5.4, SD=4.9) as opportunities and 97 statements (M=3.2, 
SD=2.2) as threats.   
 
Main effects of organizational levels and SWOT, and interaction effect between them 
 Main effects. A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to establish main effects of 
the following factors: (a) number of statements coded in the four categories of organizational 
level (top management level, mid level management, personnel level and industry level) and 
(b) number of statements coded in the four levels of SWOT. Main effects and interaction 
effect are displayed in table 1. Note that eta squared is used as a measure for effect size, a 
measure not usually preferred (e.g. Bakeman, 2005; Olejnik & Algina, 2003). Reporting 
effect sizes derived from analysis of variance that include repeated measures is problematic 
(Bakeman, 2005), and because there is only one error term for each analysis conducted (only 
one main effect with four repeated measures), the effect size presented by eta squared is 
therefore considered satisfactory for this study.  
 
Table 1 
Main effects of organizational level and SWOT, and interaction effect between organizational 
level and SWOT  
Factor   df  F  sig.  n² 
Org. level  3, 87  8.65  .000  .230 
SWOT   3, 87           11.74  .000  .290 
Org. level*SWOT 9, 26  6.51  .000  .183 
 
As seen from table 1, both factors tested showed statistically significant main effects. 
This means that the distribution of statements between organizational levels and SWOT, when 
considered independently, is not coincidental. To further investigate the relationships between 
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dimensions within each factor, post-hoc comparisons were carried out. This gives an 
indication about which of the dimensions in a single factor are significantly different from 
each other in terms of number of statements coded on each dimension.  
Post-hoc comparisons for organizational level (table 2), using paired samples t-tests, 
showed that the number of statements targeted at the industry level were significantly 
different from the number of statements targeted at the top management level, the number of 
statements targeted at mid level management, and the number of statements targeted at the 
personnel level. The number of statements targeted at the top management level was also 
significantly different from the number of statements targeted at mid level management. A 
significant difference in the number of statements targeted at two different levels indicates 
that the difference is of a magnitude that makes it 5 % or less likely that the difference is 
found by chance.     
 
Table 2 
Paired samples t-tests for organizational level 
Factor  M  SD  SE  t  df  Sig. 
I/TM  -6.90  7.42  1.35  -5.10  29  .000 
I/MLM -3.20  5.51  1.01  -3.18  29                    .003 
I/V  -3.90  6.00  1.09  -3.56  29  .001 
TM/MLM  3.70  9.31  1.70   2.18  29  .038 
TM/V   3.00  9.04  1.65   1.82  29  .079 
MLM/V -0.70  6.64  1.21  -0.58  29  .568 
Note: TM=top management level, MLM=mid level management, V=vessel/shop floor level, and I=industry 
level.  
 
Post-hoc comparisons for SWOT (table 3), using paired samples t-tests showed that 
the number of strengths differed significantly from the number of threats; the number of 
weaknesses differed significantly from the number of opportunities and the number of threats; 
and the number of opportunities differed significantly from the number of threats.  
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Table 3 
Paired samples t-tests for SWOT 
Factor  M  SD  SE  t  df  Sig. 
S/W  -2.40  8.04  1.47  -1.64  29  .113 
S/O   1.50  4.83  0.88   1.70  29  .099 
S/T   3.57  5.94  1.08   3.29  29  .003 
W/O   3.90  5.55  1.01   3.85  29  .001 
W/T   5.97  4.46  0.81   7.33  29  .000 
O/T   2.07  4.09  0.75   2.77  29  .010 
Note: S=strengths, W=weaknesses, O=opportunities, and T=threats 
 
Interaction effect. A repeated measures ANOVA analysis was carried out to reveal any 
interaction effect between organizational level and SWOT. The result is displayed in table 1 
together with the main effects. The interaction effect showed a significant result, indicating 
that the effect of one of the variables changes over the levels of the other variable (Bordens et 
al., 2005). Figure 1 gives a graphical illustration of the interaction effect.  
Most of the statements that were targeted at the top management level are strengths 
and weaknesses. The number of opportunities is also large, and the number of threats is 
notably lower. The distribution of statements targeted at the top management level on SWOT 
is the only organizational level where there does not seem to be a relationship between 
positive (strengths and opportunities) and negative (weaknesses and threats) statements. For 
mid level management, there seems to be a pattern in the distribution on SWOT; the number 
of positive statements outweighs the negative. The number of statements is also quite evenly 
distributed according to this premise. The number of statements targeted at the personnel level 
shows the most extreme differences in positive and negative statements compared to the other 
organizational levels, taking into account the total number of statements targeted at each 
organizational level. The number of weaknesses and threats are both higher than in any of the 
other organizational levels, and the number of strengths and opportunities are lower than both 
the top management level and mid level management. The industry level shows an even 
distribution of statements with more negative than positive statements.   
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Figure 1. Number of statements over organizational levels and SWOT 
 
 
Content analysis of statements on an organizational level and SWOT format, and 
compatibility with the Safety Climate Model and the Campaign Model 
The clusters of statement content over organizational levels and SWOT levels are 
displayed in table 4, 5, 6, and 7. The clustered themes’ compatibility with the eight factors 
proposed by Flin et al. (2000) to comprise safety climate and the eight dimensions in the 
Campaign Model are also indicated. 
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Table 4 
Statements clustered in themes on top management level over SWOT levels 
SWOT     Theme        No. Statements 
 
Strengths 
 
• Top management has pinpointed important safety aspects within                       
the organization that has an improvement potential, and means of                
attaining those improvements (1)(8*)     24 
• Top management communicating clear and goal-directed commitment                        
to improving safety throughout the organization as well as creating an                
open arena for feedback (1)(5*)       20 
• Concrete safety improvements within the organization as a result of                   
management commitment (8)(8*)      14 
• Open communication and routines regarding risk assessment and    
misjudgements/ errors originating from top management (3)(5*)  13 
• Strong safety profile, both internally and externally, originating from           
top management (1)(6*)         9 
• Broad experience and solid competence in top management (5)(7*)    3 
• Top management demanding and maintaining a high technical standard   
onboard all vessels (2)(9*)        3 
• Top management identifying themselves directly to the sea staff (1)(5*)   2 
 
Weaknesses 
 
• Lack of safety commitment in top management (1)(8*)   30 
• Unstructured and insufficient implementation of policies originating 
from top management and subsequent follow-up (2)(5*)   23 
• Top management does not sufficiently consider the level of knowledge           
and cultural differences, or working situation of employees in lower    
hierarchical levels when communicating policies (2)(5*)   21 
• Top management and top management policies are not visible to lower   
hierarchical units within the organizational network and vice versa (1)(5*) 15 
• Top management does not include mid-level management in decision    
making processes and in the formulation of strategy (9)(5*)     5 
• Top management distributing blame after incidents or accidents (7)(5*)   3 
• Insufficient control over technical maintenance onboard the vessels (2)(5*)   1 
 
Opportunities  
• Adapting/ tailoring tasks related to improving safety to each organizational   
subunit/ and identifying specific tasks for commercial departments (9)(5*) 30 
• Top management must invest more on training of crew (5)(9*)  15 
• Top management should commit all employees to safety in terms of                           
responsibility, and act accordingly (1)(6*)     12 
• Top management should invest more resources on keeping experienced        
and competent employees within the organizational network  
        to build loyalty (5)(9*)           9  
• Reducing the distance between shore and sea by letting sea staff join the      
office for some time, and vice versa (9)(5*)       8 
• Top management providing circular letters and news to the whole             
organizational network (9)(5*)        5 
• Procedure for measuring safety through formal processes (2)(9*)    2 
 
Threats 
• Tendency of low participation, commitment and level of knowledge  
related to safety activities in top management (1)(8*)     8  
• Pressure from increasingly competitive demands to push safety limits (9)(8*)   4 
23 
• Cultural and linguistic problems among employees (9)(5*)         3 
• Low retention rate among sea staff will make it challenging to develop 
structured and costly safety training (5)(9*)       2 
• Difficulties in recruiting Norwegian people with sailing experience to    
top management (5)(9*)         2 
SUM                      286 
Note: Numbers written in parenthesis behind each cluster theme indicate the match with the eight factors for 
safety climate proposed by Flin et al. (2000), where (1)=Management attitudes and behaviors, (2)=Safety 
systems, (3)=Risk, (4)=Work pressure, (5)=Competence, (6)=Procedures and rules, (7)=Blame, 
(8)=Organizational learning, (9)=Not accounted for by any of the eight factors proposed by Flin et al. (2000).  
Numbers with the symbol * behind them written in parenthesis behind each cluster theme indicate the match 
with the eight-factors Campaign Model, where (1*)=Stress/Mental capacity, (2*)=Fatigue, (3*)=Authority, 
(4*)=Situational awareness, (5*)=Communication and Blame, (6*)=Leadership, (7*)=The team as a barrier, 
(8*)=Safety commitment, and (9*)=Not accounted for by any of the eight factors in the Campaign Model. 
 
Table 5 
Statements clustered in themes on mid level management level over different SWOT levels 
SWOT     Theme        No. Statements 
 
Strengths 
 
• Good communication and support from mid-level management 
to vessels (including no-blame) (7)(5*)     24 
• Communicating and practicing safety policies originating from  
top management in the rest of the organizational 
network (adapting procedures to its audience) (2)(5*)   20 
• Initiating tactics to improve safety (seminars, visits to vessels,  
feedback from vessels, accident investigation) (1)(8*)    10 
• High standards regarding education and experience requirements 
for employees at sea and ashore (5)(9*)        9 
 
Weaknesses 
 
• Problems with supplying crew, information and equipment to the 
vessels (crew shortage and restricted budgets) (5)(9*)   15 
• Putting too much workload on sea and shore staff in terms of 
unuseful paperwork and reporting, and too long contracts (4)(7*)  11 
• Sea staff having difficulties identifying with the ship management 
company they belong to (9)(5*)        5 
• Putting blame on sea staff on occasions where correct action has not 
been taken (7)(5*)         3 
• Inexperienced employees in mid level management (5)(9*)     3 
• Conflicting commitments to follow policies and procedures from 
several ship owners (top management) (9)(8*)      2 
 
Opportunities 
 
• Strengthening sea staff in terms of: more crew, stable crew, quality crew 
training, and improvements in technology (5)(9*)    24 
• Strengthening the relationship between sea and shore side of the  
organizational network to make sea staff indentify with the organization 
(visiting the vessels, permanent contracts, and having  
sea staff in the office) (9)(8*)      15 
24 
• Simplifying rules and regulations so that they can be understood as procedures 
that are possible to follow (2)(5*)        7 
• Creating an open environment for sharing information throughout the  
organizational network (9)(5*)        6 
• Putting pressure on regulatory bodies to improve working conditions at 
sea and reduce pressure on actors in the industry (6)(9*)     2 
 
Threats 
 
• Overall competence level of sea and shore staff in the international market 
is decreasing as well as a general lack of sea staff because the market is  
increasing very rapidly (5)(9*)      14 
• Being in a buffer position between top management demands and  
shop floor practices makes it difficult to live by a no-blame culture in  
practice (7)(5*)          2 
• Safety is one of the first and easiest factors to compromise in times of 
financial/ economical recessions and commercial pressure (1/4)(8*)    2 
• Overall workload for mid level management and sea staff is  
continuously increasing (4)(7*)        1  
SUM           175                      
Note: Numbers written in parenthesis behind each cluster theme indicate the same as in table 4. Numbers with 
the symbol * behind them written in parenthesis behind each cluster theme indicate the same as in table 4. 
 
Table 6 
Statements clustered in themes on the personnel level over different SWOT levels 
SWOT     Theme        No. Statements 
 
Strengths 
 
• Sea staff read and discuss safety rules and regulations, and apply    
them in their daily work (2)(8*)      13 
• Free flow of communication between all ranks onboard the vessel (9)(5*)   6 
• Competence level among senior officers in terms of experience and 
education is high (5)(9*)         4 
• Sea staff report all problems and issues to the shore office  
(open dialogue) (9)(5*)           2 
• Indications of situational awareness among sea staff (8)(4*)     2 
• Loyalty towards the ship owner (9)(9*)       1 
 
Weaknesses 
 
• Lack of education, experience, and high turnover in rank among sea staff 
 (especially junior ranks and ratings) (5)(9*)    25 
• Workload is too high for sea staff in terms of: too much paperwork, 
breaking work and rest hours regulations, work environment being 
psychologically challenging, commercial pressure, number of crew (4)(1*) 23 
• Hesitation to confront superiors about safety issues when safety rules 
are ignored (9)(3*)       16 
• Level of English is very poor among sea staff, and cultural barriers  
are high (9)(5*)        16 
• Failure to comply with safety rules, and subsequent risk taking in 
situations where risk is high (3)(4*)     14 
• Lack of work engagement/ work morale among ratings in terms of  
professionalism and loyalty (9)(7*)       9 
 
25 
Opportunities 
 
• Reducing the traditional authoritative leadership hierarchy onboard  
in order to improve communication and team efficiency (9)(3*)  10 
• Increasing the number of staff onboard the vessels as well as better utilisation 
of the existing workforce (4)(7*)        8 
• Better planning ahead of operations (6)(4*)       2 
• Shorter contracts, and permanent contracts for sea staff (4)(9*)    1 
 
Threats 
 
• Workload is too high on all crew, especially when at port (commercial 
pressure, and inspections) (4)(1*)      14 
• With a rapidly growing market, crew language competence, education 
and experience is increasingly compromised, and retention rate is going 
down (5)(9*)        14 
• Responsibility among crew is concentrated to certain senior ranks,  
reinforcing unhealthy authority (9)(3*)     12 
• Paperwork and other forms of reporting take the focus of the crew 
away from safety (4)(7*)         4  
SUM           196 
Note: Numbers written in parenthesis behind each cluster theme indicate the same as in table 4. Numbers with 
the symbol * behind them written in parenthesis behind each cluster theme indicate the same as in table 4. 
 
Table 7 
Statements clustered in themes on industry level over different SWOT levels 
SWOT     Theme        No. Statements 
 
Strengths 
 
• Well established international safety routines (6)(9*)   10 
• Strict requirements regarding technical quality onboard the 
 vessels (safety equipment) (6)(9*)        7 
• Regular assessments and audits of ship owners, ship management companies,  
        and vessels by representatives of the industry and oil- majors (6)(5*)    5 
• Very large commercial/ economical consequences if safety is bypassed 
 and if accidents occur (9)(9*)        3 
 
Weaknesses 
 
• The market is growing faster than the education of new seafarers (5)(9*) 14 
• New rules and regulations regarding safety creates more extra work 
than it enhances safety (6)(9*)        9 
• Safety systems tend to be written as an reaction to an incident (2)(9*)    9 
• The margins for profit and loss are very small, forcing actors in the  
industry to take shortcuts (9)(8*)          4 
  
Opportunities 
 
• The industry must focus on making rules and regulations that will 
enhance the quality of crew (5)(9*)       3 
 
Threats 
 
• Shortage of quality seafarers, both ashore and at sea (5)(9*)   10 
26 
• When the oil market is good, safety requirements will be compromised  
by oil majors and ship owners (9)(8*)       5 
SUM           79 
Note: Numbers written in parenthesis behind each cluster theme indicate the same as in table 4. Numbers with 
the symbol * behind them written in parenthesis behind each cluster theme indicate the same as in table 4. 
 
Compatibility of the clustered themes with the Safety Climate Model. The clusters of 
statements developed in the content analysis (table 4-7) were compared qualitatively to the 
Safety Climate Model (Flin et al., 2000). A summary of the results is displayed in table 8. 
 
Table 8 
Distribution of statements over the factors in the Safety Climate Model and organizational 
levels 
                                                TM          MLM          P          I         Sum     % accounted for   
Management attitudes 120       12              0  0          132          17.9         
Safety systems    50       27            13 9     99          13.5 
Risk      13         0            14 0   27            3.7           
Work pressure      0       12            50 0   62            8.4 
Competence     31       65             43       27 166          22.6 
Procedures/ rules      0         2   2        31   35            4.8 
Blame        3       29   0  0   32            4.4 
Organisational learning   14         0   2  0   16            2.2 
Not accounted for     55       28             72        12         167          22.7 
Sum                                        286          175           196        79         736         100.0        
Note: TM=top management level, MLM=mid level management, P=personnel level/vessel, and I=industry level. 
 
Compatibility of clustered themes with the Campaign Model. The clusters of 
statements developed in the content analysis (table 4-7) were compared qualitatively to the 
Campaign Model derived from Fortuna’s safety campaign. A summary of the results are 
displayed in table 9. As outlined above, only four of these factors, relating to human factors 
on the organizational level, are of particular interest for the purpose of comparing the 
Campaign Model to the Safety Climate Model (Flin et al., 2000). Note therefore that the four 
factors relating to the personnel level have been aggregated in table 9.   
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Table 9 
Distribution of statements over organizational level and the Campaign Model 
                                                TM          MLM          P          I         Sum     % accounted for   
The four personnel factors*     0         0  93  0   93     12.6  
Communication  149       67             24          5   245          33.3 
Leadership         21         0   0          0   21            2.8 
Team        3       12            21  0   36            4.9   
Safety commitment      80       29            13  9 131           17.8 
Not accounted for     33       67             45        65        210           28.5 
Sum                                        286          175           196        79        736         100.0        
Note: TM=top management level, MLM=mid level management, P=personnel level/vessel, and I=industry level.  
*=The four human factors on the personnel level are aggregated in this table as they are of less interest for the 
comparison between the Campaign Model and the Safety Climate Model. 
  
An account for the statements that did not reflect the Safety Climate Model. 21 
clustered themes representing 22.7 % of the statements did not reflect any of the eight 
dimensions of the Safety Climate Model (Flin et al., 2000). Ten of these themes (47.6 % of 
the statements that were not accounted for by the Safety Climate Model) reflected the 
communication dimension in the Campaign Model. Five of these themes (23.8 %) reflected 
the dimension safety commitment in the Campaign Model. Three of these themes (14.3 %) 
reflect the authority dimension in the Campaign Model. As the authority dimension in the 
Campaign Model is considered a human factor on the personnel level, it is quite natural that 
this theme will not reflect the Safety Climate Model, as safety climate must be seen in 
connection with human factors on the organizational level. Only two of these themes (9.5 %) 
did not reflect either of the two models, neither the Safety Climate Model, nor the Campaign 
Model. 
An account for the statements that did not reflect the Campaign Model. Twenty-five 
clustered themes, representing 28.5 % of the statements, did not reflect any of the eight 
dimensions in the Campaign Model. These statements are largely concerned with the 
competence, educational level and degree of experience among members of the organizational 
network: 77.6 % of the statements that did not reflect any of the eight factors in the Campaign 
Model were reflected in the competence dimension of Flin et al.’s (2000) Safety Climate 
Model.      
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Discussion 
 
Summary of key results 
 The first hypothesis of this study was that semi-structured interviews in a SWOT-
based format, asking general questions about safety, would produce information that reflects 
the chosen model for safety climate (Flin et al., 2000). The data was in agreement with the 
hypothesis: 77.3 % of all the identified statements were compatible to one of the eight factors 
in the model. All the factors were represented among the statements. The second hypothesis 
was that the interviews would bring fourth relevant data on safety climate, not accounted for 
by the Safety Climate Model (Flin et al., 2000). The data was also in agreement with this 
hypothesis: 22.7 % of the statements did not reflect any of the eight factors in the Safety 
Climate Model. Of these statements, 47.6 % of them were related to the communication 
dimension in the Campaign Model. The third hypothesis was related to the Campaign Model 
and its success in raising awareness on human factors in Fortuna. It was found that the 
members of the organizational network’s safety focus, to a large degree, reflected the 
Campaign Model: 71.5 % of the identified statements were related to one of the dimensions in 
the Campaign Model. A causal relationship between the organizational network’s safety focus 
and the Campaign Model can not be implied, but the results argue in favor of a continuation 
of Fortuna’s safety campaign from which the Campaign Model is derived.  
  
Quantitative results 
 Organizational level. The results showed that there was a significant main effect of the 
number of statements coded over the four organizational levels. Post-hoc analysis showed that 
the industry level was significantly different from all other organizational levels. The industry 
level was, as outlined above, only included to account for the statements that were related to 
safety and were not possible to categorize within either of the other organizational levels. It 
should be considered a rest category and it is therefore not surprising that the industry level is 
different from the other organizational levels regarding the number of statements. Through the 
content analysis it was further established that these statements were also different regarding 
content: The statements were largely concerned with premises for safety defined by national 
and international rules and regulations in the shipping industry. They are therefore beyond the 
control of Fortuna, assuming that rules and regulations are followed and, accordingly, are also 
outside the scope of the present study.   
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The top management level was significantly different from mid level management. 
None of the other organizational levels, except the industry level, were significantly different 
from each other. This finding suggests that the statements are quite evenly distributed over the 
three organizational levels representing the organizational network in the present study (top 
management level, mid level management and personnel level). Any differences between 
these organizational levels in the distribution of statements over the SWOT categories can 
consequently not be attributed to large differences in the total number of statements coded on 
these organizational levels.  
 SWOT. There was a significant main effect of the number of statements coded over the 
four levels of SWOT. Overall, more statements were coded on the present perspective 
(strengths and weaknesses) than on the future perspective (opportunities and threats). A 
combination of categories into present and future categories might therefore have been useful 
for the interpretation of the analysis. However, the post-hoc comparisons between the four 
categories revealed that there was a significant difference between number of opportunities 
and number of threats, and that the number of statements coded as strengths and the number 
of statements coded as opportunities were not significantly different from each other. The 
categories were therefore kept in their original form.  
The number of weaknesses outweighed the number of strengths overall, although the 
difference was not significant. This finding is striking as it is often found when conducting 
organizational research that employees fail to acknowledge the negative aspects of their own 
organization and show a resistance to change (Argyris, 1990).           
Interaction between organizational level and SWOT. The interaction effect between 
organizational levels and SWOT revealed that the top management level received more 
statements about the present (strengths and weaknesses) compared to the other organizational 
levels. This may reflect the fact that the statements regarding employees’ satisfaction with the 
safety campaign were consistently coded on the top management level. Further, mid level 
management was the only organizational level where, overall, more positive (strengths and 
opportunities) than negative (weaknesses and threats) statements were identified. On the 
personnel level, the number of weaknesses was much higher than all the other SWOT 
categories. The number of weaknesses on the personnel level was also higher than on any of 
the other organizational levels. This finding may have two explanations: First, it may be that 
the high frequency of weaknesses on the personnel level reflects reality; the largest safety 
challenges lies on the personnel level. Second, the high frequency of weaknesses on the 
personnel level may also indicate that there is a general tendency in the organizational 
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network to attribute human factors to the personnel level and a failure to acknowledge human 
factors on the organizational level. The answer may also lie somewhere in the middle. The 
content analysis of the interviews revealed that 77.3 % of the statements were related to the 
Safety Climate Model (concerning human factors on the organizational level) and that 71.5 % 
of the statements were related to the Campaign Model (where four of the factors concern 
human factors on the organizational level). These findings appear to be contradictory to the 
above suggested explanations. A plausible interpretation might be that human factors relating 
to the organizational level were attributed to the personnel level on occasions where they were 
considered weaknesses. If the latter is true, then it is debatable whether organizational 
learning has taken place in the organizational network. It is often the case that the 
responsibility for safety is placed on the personnel level (Argyris, 1990). 
 
Measurement approaches to safety climate 
 The most frequently represented dimension in the Safety Climate Model was 
competence (22.6 % of the statements), the second most frequent dimension was management 
attitudes and behaviors (17.8 %), the third most frequent dimension was safety systems (13.5 
%),  and the fourth most frequent dimension was work pressure (8.6 %). Except for the high 
proportion of statements in the competence dimensions, the results are consistent with what 
Flin et al. (2000) found in their review of the research that has attempted to establish safety 
climate factor structures: Three of the four strongest dimensions in the present interviews are 
indicated by Flin et al. (2000) to be the most frequently included dimensions in their review. 
The most frequent dimension in the present study, competence, was not found in a 
large amount of the surveys reviewed by Flin et al. (2000). As stated in the theoretical 
framework, Flin et al. found this dimension likely to be influenced by broader economic 
conditions such as labor market and training budgets. They also suggest that an increasing 
emphasis on competence in non-technical skills may also be included in this factor. Since the 
beginning of the 21st century, the shipping industry has been struggling with a shortage of 
qualified and experienced seafarers on the global market, and this problem is currently 
reaching a peak. Furthermore, through it safety campaign targeted at human factors, Fortuna 
has expressed an increased emphasis on and appreciation of competence in non-technical 
skills. It is therefore presumed that this dimension is important for both the actors in the 
shipping industry in general and for members of Fortuna’s organizational network specifically 
at the present moment. 
31 
Two dimensions in the Safety Climate Model were proposed by Flin et al. (2000) as 
possible dimensions involved in the more underlying safety climate: blame and organizational 
learning. In the present study, blame accounted for 4.7 % of the total amount of statements, 
and was also included in the Campaign Model in the communication and blame dimension. 
Organizational learning accounted for 2.2 % of the statements. This study did not provide 
support for Flin et al.’s (2000) proposal to include these two dimensions in the safety climate 
construct. However, more research is needed to establish these factors’ future existence in the 
safety climate construct.      
The results indicate that the data gathered through semi-structured interviews is indeed 
related to safety climate, as defined in the Safety Climate Model proposed by Flin et al. 
(2000).  
Quantitative surveys are the common measurement approach in modern research on 
safety climate. This approach is challenging with respect to identifying core components of 
the construct and pinpointing means of studying them. It is not constructed to register 
organization-specific aspects that may be involved in determining the safety climate. 
Transforming the multifaceted and partly subjective phenomenon of safety to a quantitative 
size will hardly capture more than bits and pieces of the whole. In some cases, the aspects of 
the construct that remain unstudied and unaccounted for may be of such importance that an 
amputated picture is constructed of the total phenomenon. In those cases, it should be 
considered whether a qualitative reflection of the construct, where the complexity can only be 
suspected and indicated, will be more valuable. Schneider (2000) suggests that when 
attempting to study the underlying atmosphere in organizations such as the safety climate, 
restricting what one can find by predefined dimensions using questionnaire surveys or rigidly 
structured interview guides, will most probably not uncover the complexity of the construct.  
It is important to acknowledge that changing the safety climate in organizations is an 
approach to changing effectiveness (Schneider, 2000). Safe operations will be of interest to 
the extent that it lets the actor operate in the desired market: The actor has to live up to 
required safety standards formulated through laws and regulations designed to protect the 
crew, the cargo, and the environment. Safe operations will further be of interest if, on a short 
or a long term basis, it can be proven profitable and efficient for the actor through fewer 
accidents or oil spills, lower maintenance costs, or provide other commercial advantages. 
Only if it can be demonstrated that the safety climate is a constraint for efficiency, a change 
program should be launched (Schneider, 2000). The present study argues that proving the 
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safety climate to be a constraint for efficiency in an organization, requires more thorough and 
deeper investigations than can be given through a questionnaire survey.  
Research has shown that interviews in many cases will facilitate reflection upon 
knowledge that would otherwise remain silent in interviewees’ cognition (West, Hirst, 
Richter, & Shipton, 2004; Kazama, Forster, Hebl, West, & Dawson, 2002). These reflections 
may alone contribute to raising awareness on the phenomenon of interest, in this case human 
factors and safety climate, because the knowledge is made conscious and structured. This 
advantage of interviews would be of great value to anyone who wants to improve safety 
climate within an organization. The SWOT-format of the interviews must in this respect be 
seen as a tool to facilitate and assist reflection on all aspects of the phenomenon under 
investigation.  
Hypothesis one is supported: A qualitative semi-structured interview approach is 
recommended for collecting data on safety climate on the basis of the present results. The 
SWOT-based format of the interviews and the coding of statements in SWOT categories seem 
sensitive to data concerning safety climate and human factors. Converting qualitative 
interview data to a quantitative, measurable form in NVivo 7 has also provided important 
dimensions to the study, utilizing advantages from both quantitative and qualitative research 
approaches.   
 
The effect of Fortuna’s safety campaign 
Clustered themes of statements reflecting the four personnel level categories in the 
Campaign Model (14.9 %), were only identified on the personnel level, accounting for 47.4 % 
of the statements coded on this organizational level. This indicates that the factors are indeed 
related to the personnel level, as identified. They did not account for a substantial amount of 
the statements overall, however, suggesting that only to a limited extent, do they give an 
account for the safety focus of the organizational network.  
The four human factors on the organizational level in the Campaign Model accounted 
for 58.8 % of the identified statements. Communication was the strongest dimension (33.3 %) 
and safety commitment was the second strongest dimension (17.8 %).  
The Campaign Model accounted for a substantial amount of the statements identified. 
There may be several reasons for this finding. One possibility is that the campaign has been 
successful in raising awareness about human factors, particularly on the organizational level. 
As there are no sources of data about attitudes toward safety in the organizational network 
before the campaign was launched in 2002, it is difficult to be conclusive about any 
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explanations for the present safety focus within the organizational network. However, the 
higher than expected frequency of future reflections in the SWOT coding, speaks in favor of 
the possibility that the campaign has been successful in raising awareness of human factors: It 
is expected that any campaign provides clear and goal-directed suggestions for the future 
(Conner & Norman, 2005). Accordingly, members of an organization who have their goals 
for the future manifested in a campaign, for example, would be expected to reflect more often 
upon the future than members of an organization where future goals are less explicitly 
expressed.  
Another finding that speaks in favor of the campaign’s effect in raising awareness is 
the overall high degree of statements that were reflected in the Campaign Model and the 
Safety Climate Model. This finding is interesting for two reasons: First, it points to a high 
degree of reflection among members of the organizational network on dimensions of their 
working situation that are quite abstract and complex. Many studies have suggested (e.g. 
Reynolds, Sinatra, & Jetton, 1996) that the level of reflection is generally low among 
individuals with poor education, and that it increases with years of education. Second, in the 
eastern part of the world (eastern Europe and Asia), organizational climate is not - to the same 
degree as in the Western world - acknowledged as an important component involved in 
efficiency, creativity, production and safety (Lamvik, 2002). In these, often collectivistic 
cultures, psychological well-being of people and organizations are perhaps understood 
differently from what is the Western tradition (Hogg & Vaughan, 2005). With the large 
diversity in educational level (from no education to high education) and line of work, as well 
as the cultural diversity among the interviewees, it is impressive and surprising that the level 
of reflection on this area is as high as it is.  
The method and the data of the present study do not allow for an establishment of a 
causal relationship between Fortuna’s safety campaign and the safety focus within the 
organizational network. Many reasons may be used to explain the present safety focus among 
the interviewed subjects. Regardless, the safety focus in the organizational network does 
reflect the Campaign Model, and accordingly, also Fortuna’s safety campaign. This finding 
speaks in favor of a continuation of the safety campaign in Fortuna. Hypothesis three is 
answered: the Campaign Model is strongly reflected in the interviews. 
 
Suggestions for further developments of the Safety Climate Model    
Through the content analysis of the data and subsequent clustering of statements in 
themes, it was found that 22.7 % of the identified statements from the interviews were not 
34 
accounted for by the Safety Climate Model (Flin et al., 2000). Nearly half of these (47.6 %) 
were accounted for through one of the human factors on the organizational level in the 
Campaign Model: the communication and blame dimension. This dimension refers to the 
shortening of communication lines within the organizational network and establishing a sense 
of unity and loyalty among the members. It is further concerned with the distribution of blame 
within the organizational network. Blame is also one of the dimensions in the Safety Climate 
Model. The statements that did not reflect this model are therefore concerned with the 
communication aspect in the communication and blame dimension. This finding provides 
support for arguing that communication is an important determiner for human factors on the 
organizational level. If it is true that human factors on the organizational level and safety 
climate are strongly related constructs, then communication may be an important determiner 
for safety climate within the present organizational network. 
The structure of the present organizational network is complex. Each of the 
organizational levels identified for the purpose of the study (top management level, mid level 
management, personnel level and industry level), are in reality independent organizations, but 
with strong influence upon each other’s business and operation. The Safety Climate Model 
proposed by Flin et al. (2000) may not be designed with the purpose of addressing safety 
climate within an organizational network as complex as the present. A consistent safety 
climate may be harder to identify within such an organizational structure because there are 
many more factors that may influence each organizational unit than it is in a single 
organization with a straight forward structure. In the present organizational network, for 
example, each ship management company (identified as mid level management in this study) 
probably have their own safety climates, determined by organizational aspects beyond 
Fortuna’s control and influence. The large proportion of reflections around communication in 
the present organizational network may indicate that communication, as defined in the 
Campaign Model, is particularly important for complex organizational network structures like 
the present. Assuming this to be true, researchers must specify for which organizational 
structures the safety climate construct applies. Safety climate models constructed for specific 
organizational structures or specific industries may be a way of minimizing the source of error 
for safety climate models that lies in the uniqueness of every organization and organizational 
structure.  
On the other hand, objective measures of safety performance can only be measured in 
relation to other’s safety performance: In order to become “the world’s safest fleet”, as is 
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Fortuna’s vision, a comparison to other shipping companies is necessary. Global measures of 
safety climate might prove valuable for comparisons and benchmarking.  
The Safety Climate Model (Flin et al., 2000) is neither industry, nor structure specific. 
If such a global safety climate construct is preferred, it should, on the basis of the present 
findings, be considered whether communication, as defined in the Campaign Model, should 
be included as an additional dimension in the Safety Climate Model. Hypothesis two is 
supported by the above suggestion of communication as an additional dimension in the Safety 
Climate Model.  
 
Validity and reliability of the results  
 Validity is often defined with the question: Are you measuring what you think you are 
measuring (Kvale, 1996)? If measuring in this context requires numbers, then qualitative 
research can not answer this question if it does not result in exact values. In a broader 
meaning of the concept, validity can refer to the degree that a method investigates what it is 
intended to investigate, to “the extent to which our observations indeed reflect the phenomena 
or variables of interest to us” (Pervin, 1984, p. 48, in Kvale, 1996). Within this wider 
conception of validity, qualitative research can lead to valid scientific knowledge.  
The interviews. When performing interviews, data is established in a relationship 
between the interviewers and the interviewee based on the questions that are put forward 
(Flick, 2002). Other questions might have established different empirical data and results. The 
internal validity of the data from the present interviews can be recognized on the basis of 
preference for method and subsequent interpretation of the data.   
All interviews carried out on the personnel level were done so in the interviewees’ 
second or third language. All of these interviews were affected by language difficulties with 
the implication that reflection on the personnel level might have been impaired because of 
these problems. The validity of the data is weakened from these language issues.   
The sample. A representative sample was not easy to reach by any medium. Only one 
organizational unit from each organizational level was therefore included in the study. The 
sample criteria were established to exclude third-variable problems that could have arisen if 
no direct communication line between the personnel level and mid level management had 
existed. An implication of this is that the results represent only this communication line, and 
the external validity is therefore low. The results are nevertheless valuable as a point of 
reference in developing hypotheses for future quantitative or qualitative contributions to 
safety climate research.    
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The sample size in the present study must be seen in relation to the practical 
constraints and time limitations of a Master’s thesis as well as the transient nature of the 
population to be studied. The sample on each organizational level was 10 +/- 1 (in total, 
N=30). Measuring the safety climate within the organizational network would have required a 
larger sample size and subjects from different organizational units within the same 
organizational level (Zohar, 2002; Zohar, 2004; Zohar, 2005). The exploratory purpose of the 
present study allows for a smaller sample size, thus the size is therefore considered large 
enough to answer the study’s hypotheses.   
 Organizational levels. It is debatable whether the chosen division of organizational 
levels gives the best reflection of reality. Some studies on safety climate (e.g. Zohar et al., 
2005) suggest, for example, a separation of shop-floor supervisors and shop-floor employees. 
Whether shop-floor supervisors in the present organizational network should then reflect the 
top officers onboard the vessels or the Superintendents employed in the ship management 
companies, is an obvious question. This question of definition has been solved in the present 
study by defining organizational levels that are physically separated and represent distinct 
units (top management=Fortuna, mid level management=the ship management companies, 
and personnel level=the vessels). In the coding of the statements over organizational levels, 
additional organizational levels, or a more sophisticated definition of organizational levels, 
would likely have given a larger source of error as it would have been more difficult to 
interpret what organizational level the statements were targeted at.  
 The Campaign Model. The Campaign Model was constructed based on Fortuna’s 
safety campaign. The validity of this construction should not be questioned as the campaign is 
very clear on its objectives. The pragmatic validity, or the degree to which the results of the 
study are helpful for Fortuna to improve safety, is certainly increased by including this model 
in the study: First, the model represents what the organization itself has identified as 
important aspects of the human element in safety. This premise should always be taken into 
account when doing organizational research. Second, as stated above, no research exists in a 
vacuum. Drawing methodological and theoretical inferences from the research carried out in 
Fortuna’s organizational network would not have given valid results if the applied attempts to 
improve safety had not been taken into consideration for the study. Third, by relating the 
results to a safety paradigm already known to the members of the organizational network, the 
practical value will assumingly be greater for its members and for the future improvements of 
the campaign.   
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 Data analysis. The findings of this study are based on interview data analyzed in both 
a quantitative and qualitative manner. A framework for analyzing interview data 
quantitatively has been used in an attempt to rise above the opinionated results often 
established through qualitative analysis approaches. Precise relationships have indeed been 
established. However, the present quantitative contribution is best understood if it is seen in 
relation to the qualitative data. It is not possible to establish precise relationships between 
variables are in qualitative data. The qualitative contribution is nevertheless of great value for 
the conclusions of this study. The validity of the present results must be considered with this 
in mind. If conclusions based on quantitative data and quantitative analyses are preferred, 
these results can nevertheless provide valuable indications and suggestions for future 
quantitative research on the concept of safety climate.  
 
Suggestions for further research 
Very few published empirical studies – if any - have applied the principles from 
SWOT analysis as a tool for generating data from interviews. The only located research 
contributions on this particular methodological area are two unpublished Master’s theses from 
the Department of Psychology, University of Oslo (Edvardsen, 2007; Straumsheim, 2007) on 
organizational citizenship behavior and psychosocial work environment, respectively. Only 
Straumsheim (2007) found the SWOT-based interview format and subsequent coding of 
statements over SWOT categories to be sensitive for data regarding psychosocial work 
environment. More research is therefore needed to determine the SWOT-based format’s 
sensitivity for data on safety climate and human factors, as well as other dimensions of 
organizational culture and climate.  
Further research is also needed to validate the communication dimension in the 
construct of safety climate, both on the global, industry and/or organizational structure-
specific levels.   
The statements extracted from the interviews were not coded according to which 
organizational level they originated from. The position of the interviewee who postulated the 
statements was not included in the analysis because the variable would not have been of 
particular value for the purpose of answering the hypotheses. By including this variable in 
future studies, the following questions could for example have been answered: What 
organizational level does the top management level regard as the weakest level? Is there a 
tendency for blaming each other for the weaknesses in the organization and taking the credit 
for the strengths? 
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The safety climate in Fortuna has not been measured in the present study. Measuring 
the safety climate within the organizational network would require data from several 
organizational units on the same organizational level. Together with an evaluation of 
Fortuna’s safety campaign, this may provide valuable guidelines for the next step in Fortuna’s 
efforts to improve safety.       
 
Conclusion 
 
Based on the findings of this study, it is argued that a precise indication of the safety 
climate in organizations will be obtained through interviews. The complexity of the safety 
climate construct makes it vulnerable to influence from the political and economical 
environment and interviews are able to account for these changing aspects of the safety 
climate construct. Further, a SWOT-based interview format seems to be sensitive to 
information concerning safety climate. 
The interviews carried out in this study were able to bring forth reflections on all 
dimensions of the Safety Climate Model (Flin et al., 2000) and more. The reflections found in 
the interviews that did not reflect any of the dimensions of the Safety Climate Model, were 
largely related to communication. Further research is needed to determine whether 
communication, as defined in the Campaign Model, should be included in a global model for 
safety climate.  
The results of this study showed that the overall level of awareness on human factors 
and safety climate was high in the organizational network, a finding that can be attributed to 
Fortuna’s safety campaign. A conclusion about the effectiveness of the campaign is 
impossible to draw but the results indicate that a continuation of the safety campaign project 
in Fortuna will bring the company closer to its goal of becoming “the world’s safest fleet”. 
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Appendix  
Introduction to interview and interview guide 
 
Introduction to interview 
(to be handed out to participants beforehand) 
 
We are very grateful that you have taken the time to let us interview you. We are Master’s 
degree students in psychology at the University of Oslo. During the following year we will be 
writing our Master’s thesis in cooperation with Fortuna on evaluating their safety initiatives 
since 2002. Data from this interview will, together with all the other interviews we will be 
performing, create the basis for our analysis. The aim with this interview is to gain 
knowledge, insights and understanding of what you have experienced, what your views are 
and your thoughts and feelings are concerning safety in the organizational network, with an 
emphasis on the human side of safety. 
 
We would like to tape record the interview so that important information will not be lost or 
forgotten. Only the two of us, together with our supervisors at the university will have access 
to the recordings. All the information you will be giving is anonymous and confidential. All 
names and personal identification will be deleted in the final thesis, and it will not be possible 
to trace any information back to you. Nothing you say will be known to any of your 
colleagues or to your employer. However, if you do not feel comfortable with recording the 
interview, we would like you to tell us, and the interview will not be recorded. Your 
participation is voluntary and you may, at any time, choose to end the session if you wish to 
do so. By answering the questions, you will give your consent to participate in this research.  
 
The interview will be based on a technique called SWOT analysis, aiming to shed light upon 
four aspects of safety within the organizational network – strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats. The questions will be very open and general, so the focus in the 
interview will be largely up to you to decide. No answers are considered more correct than 
others; the only thing we are interested in is your honest opinion.  
 
Date and place/Signature, interviewer         Date and place/Signature, interviewee 
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Interview guide 
 
Welcome to this interview. Did you read the introduction to the interview that we handed out 
to you? How do you feel about tape recording the interview? Do you have any questions 
before we start? 
 
Demographic/practical information 
We would like to start by asking you some demographic/practical questions such as age and 
position/rank. This will not be directly relevant to us, but might have an impact on your 
experiences and thoughts. 
 
1. Position 
2. Nationality 
3. Sex 
4. Age 
5. Which parts of Fortuna’s safety campaign training have you completed? (only for 
crew onboard the vessel) 
 
The following questions will be related to safety (main questions) 
 
What do consider strengths in this organizational network regarding safety? 
 
What do you consider weaknesses in this organizational network regarding safety? 
 
Can you think of any means for improving the quality of safety in the organizational 
network? 
 
Can you identify any problems that would prevent better safety in the organizational 
network? 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
46 
(Follow up questions for all main questions) 
 
Could you say something more about that? 
Can you give an example? 
Can you think of anything else? 
What do you mean by that? 
Do I understand you correctly in that what you are saying is…? 
 
 
Thank you for answering our questions! Do you have any questions regarding the interview or 
your anonymity?  
 
 
 
 
 
